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economic outcomes as well as financial stability.  
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1. Introduction 
The financial crisis of 2007 reenergized the historic debate regarding the victims of economic 
downturns and the link between recessions and income inequality. Most critics argue that the 
free markets unambiguously failed to safeguard themselves and the economy, and that this 
failure might have had a larger marginal effect on the relatively poor. However, regulatory 
policies that aim to provide a safety net for lenders, borrowers, and depositors also failed to 
prevent this crisis from developing and spreading worldwide.  
Though it may be too soon to determine who the primary victims of this crisis are, 
banking liberalization and/or reregulation can play an important role in shaping income 
inequality in different countries. Furthermore, the diversity in regulatory practices among 
countries exists despite the Basel Committee's recent initiatives to harmonize and benchmark 
regulatory frameworks. Thus, a study that assesses the impact of cross-country and timely 
variations in bank regulatory policies on income inequality is an interesting endeavor. This 
paper is, to our knowledge, the first to do that.  
 The extensive literature on the relationship between finance and the distribution of 
income generally agrees that improvements in financial markets, contracts, and intermediaries 
reduce income inequality because financial development affects the degree to which an 
individual’s future income is the result of talent and good investment ideas or inherited 
income (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2009). If financial intermediaries succeed in funding 
talented people with good investment ideas through advanced screening methods, the theory 
goes, an individual’s economic endowment should not dictate his or her future income. In 
contrast, in underdeveloped or constrained financial systems, individuals might face severely 
limited access to capital. That is, financial imperfections, such as information inconsistencies 
and transaction costs, as well as high levels of relationship lending, may be especially binding 
on the poor, who lack collateral and credit history (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2007). 
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Further, failing to liberalize the banking sector leads to local monopolies, a situation that hurts 
the poor because it creates inefficiently high lending rates and encourages relationship lending 
(Galor and Moav, 2004).  
Important early contributors to research in this area, such as Greenwood and Jovanovic 
(1990), contradict the idea of a negative relationship between financial liberalization and 
inequality. They suggest that banks with profit-maximizing behavior lend to richer firms and 
households and avoid lending to individuals with low levels of collateral. Inherent in this is 
the assumption that poor individuals are riskier and that lending to them might conflict with 
banks’ incentive to earn maximum yields on their risky assets.  
This exploration of the finance-inequality relationship does not explicitly account for 
the dynamic nature of regulatory policies related to the banking sector. To put it another way, 
the literature does not address the specific features of banking regulations in different 
countries and their evolution as a source of income inequality. This is an important limitation 
in many respects. First, the initial wave of liberalization policies in the 1980s gave way to 
reregulation of the banking sector in the 1990s and 2000s in an effort to prevent systematic 
instability and crises. Furthermore, because different types of regulatory policies can have 
widely different objectives, the effect of these policies on the distribution of income might 
also be different and/or contradictory. Finally, regulatory policies play a distinct role in 
lending behavior, and this role may be different from the one that shapes financial 
development.  
Notably, only Beck, Levine, and Levkov (2010) consider the impact of bank 
regulation on the distribution of income. In particular, they assess how liberalizing intrastate 
branching affects the distribution of income within the United States and find that 
deregulation significantly reduces inequality by boosting incomes in the lower part of the 
income distribution. They also find that deregulation has little impact on incomes above the 
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median. This is first-hand evidence that bank regulatory policies may have a central role in 
shaping the distribution of income.   
Based on these considerations, we focus on how banking regulations affect the 
distribution of income in different countries. We consider reforms in seven pillars of banking 
regulation: credit controls and reserve requirements, interest rate controls, banking-sector 
entry, capital-account transactions, bank privatizations, liberalization of securities markets, 
and banking-sector supervision and capital regulation. We examine the impact of these indices 
separately and jointly on income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient and the Theil 
index) and the distribution of income (measured by the lower and higher 10% of the income 
distribution and by poverty rates) for 87 countries. Our identification strategy accounts for the 
endogeneity of banking regulations in empirical models of income inequality.  
The empirical findings show that banking deregulation (higher liberalization) 
generally leads to lower inequality and narrower income distribution. Specifically, countries 
in the upper quartile of the banking liberalization index will, ceteris paribus, have 2.5 times 
less inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) compared to countries in the lower 
quartile of the banking liberalization index. This effect is highly statistically and economically 
significant. 
We also find that abolishing credit and interest rate controls decreases income 
inequality substantially and that more effective banking supervision has a similar effect. 
Credit and interest-rate controls also narrow the income distribution by increasing the income 
share held by the poor. Specifically, the income share held by the poorest 10% of the income 
distribution in countries in the upper 25th percentile in the banking liberalization index will, 
ceteris paribus, be 25% higher compared to countries in the lower quartile of the banking 
liberalization index. 
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We also identify heterogeneous effects of liberalization policies according to the level 
of institutional and economic development. In particular, we find that abolishing barriers to 
entry and enhancing privatization laws lower income inequality primarily in developed 
countries with stronger institutions. Hence, we conclude that economic and institutional 
development is a prerequisite for regulations to have a positive effect on the real economy 
(Laffont, 2005). Moreover, the liberalization of international capital flows increases the 
income share of both the rich and the poor. Finally, and in contrast to previous liberalization 
policies, we find that liberalizing securities markets increases income inequality. We find that 
banks pass on their increased costs and higher capital requirements to the relatively lower-
income population that lacks good credit and collateral.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data set and 
evaluates the impact of specific types of bank regulation on income inequality. Section 3 
discusses the identification issues and the econometric methodology. Section 4 presents the 
empirical results. Section 5 offers some policy implications and concludes the paper.    
 
2. Data Description 
To examine the impact of different forms of regulation on income inequality in an 
international setting, we collect country-level data. The original sample includes data from 91 
countries for which information on bank regulations is available over the period 1973-2005. 
However, the final sample includes 87 countries for which data on all our main variables is 
available. One of our two identification strategies requires information that has only been 
available since 1997. Therefore, our empirical analysis uses data for the period 1997-2005. 
Given that annual macroeconomic data are noisy (Roine, Vlachos, and Waldenström, 2009), 
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we primarily use three-year averages but also conduct a sensitivity analysis with annual and 
cross-sectional data.1 
 Table I provides a collective, formal definition of the variables in the empirical 
analysis, and Table II offers summary statistics. We also include a number of tables in the 
internet appendix: Table AI provides information on the number of countries in our sample, 
their regional group, and the extent of liberalization of their banking systems; Table AII offers 
correlation coefficients among the explanatory variables.  
[INSERT TABLES I AND II] 
 
2.1 INCOME INEQUALITY  
Our main variable to proxy inequality is the Gini coefficient from the Standardized World 
Income Inequality Database (SWIID) of Solt (2009). Alternatively, we use the Theil index 
from the University of Texas Inequality Project, which relies on data from Deininger and 
Squire (1996) and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). The 
SWIID database is the most comprehensive database on the Gini coefficient and increases 
greatly the comparability of the values between countries, primarily because it standardizes 
consumption and wage income (see Solt, 2009). In the SWIID dataset, data on the Gini 
coefficient are available for 153 countries over the period 1960-2010. The Theil index is 
available for 156 countries over the period 1963-2002. Both panels are unbalanced, with the 
Theil index having many missing observations.  
The Gini coefficient is derived from the Lorenz curve and ranges between 0 and 100. 
A low Gini indicates a more equal distribution, with 0 corresponding to perfect equality; a 
                                                 
1 As in virtually all of the empirical studies of income inequality that rely on Gini-coefficient data (e.g., Chong 
and Gradstein, 2007), the dataset is unbalanced in the sense that data for some time periods are missing for 
certain countries. Following previous studies, we construct averages for the dependent variables over specific 
time intervals by using the available observations. This procedure also smooths out some abrupt jumps in the 
year-on-year values for some countries. Sensitivity analysis on the main results using country averages and 
running cross-sectional regressions confirms that the results are unaffected by exclusion of countries where such 
abnormal changes occur.  
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higher Gini indicates more unequal distribution, with 100 corresponding to perfect inequality. 
The Gini coefficient is the most widely used measure of inequality in the empirical literature 
(e.g., Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2007; Dollar and Kraay, 2002).  
We use the index that represents household income before taxes, as this shows 
inequality exclusive of fiscal policy. Solt (2009) extensively discusses how this index is 
constructed on the basis of previous datasets on economic inequality. The average value in our 
dataset for the period 1997-2005 is 44.68 and is 40.69 for the full period. Countries such as 
Armenia, Bahamas, Kuwait, Mongolia, and Qatar have very high values, and the Czech 
Republic, China, Macao, Slovenia, and Sweden exhibit low Gini coefficients.2  
Theil’s index of inequality is an entropy measure. Maximum entropy occurs once 
income earners are indistinguishable by resources (i.e., when there is perfect equality). In real 
societies, different resources (i.e., incomes) distinguish people. The more "distinguishable" 
they are, the lower the "actual entropy" of a system consisting of income and income earners. 
Thus, higher values on the Theil index reflect higher inequality.3 In our dataset and over the 
period 1997-2005, the Theil index has a correlation coefficient of 0.73 with the Gini 
coefficient and obtains an average value of 0.07. Countries with high and low values are about 
the same as those reported for the Gini coefficient.    
The two measures are not perfectly comparable because the Gini coefficient in this 
study is based on household income, but the Theil index is based on individual wage income. 
This remains partially true, despite the considerable work on this front by Solt (2009). The 
                                                 
2 In deriving the single Gini coefficient employed here, Solt (2009) uses information from 21 different Gini 
coefficients constructed in previous studies. From this information, he estimates the SWIID Gini coefficients by 
assigning a standard error on the estimates. The largest standard errors, and thus the less reliable Gini 
coefficients, are in the early years of the SWIID dataset (1980 or before). Because our sample starts in 1997, this 
study does not cover these years. Further, the relatively high standard errors within our sample are usually related 
to large and abrupt changes in the Gini coefficients of SWIID. In our final sample there are 13 countries (both 
developing and developed) with changes higher than five points in the Gini from one three-year interval to the 
next, but there are no countries with changes higher than 10 points in the Gini. We provide sensitivity analysis 
for our main results by using multiple Monte Carlo simulations in the fashion of King, Honaker, Joseph and 
Scheve (2001). For further discussion, see Solt (2009).         
3 For a thorough description of the Theil index, see http://utip.gov.utexas.edu. 
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disadvantage of the specific Theil index is that a wage-based measure excludes nonwage 
income, such as pensions or income from self-employment (Deininger and Squire, 1996).  
The Theil index does have one advantage over the Gini coefficient, however: it 
provides information on individuals, not households. The distinction is important if there are 
systematic differences in the size of rich and poor households. Deininger and Squire (1996), 
for example, show that the Gini coefficient based on income across households provides 
estimates of inequality slightly lower than the equivalent Gini based on income across 
individuals. Even though these considerations imply that we should compare the results from 
the two measures with some caution, they also suggest that the two measures in this study are 
complementary.  
To answer whether banking sector liberalization disproportionately affects the poor, 
we employ data from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database. 
Specifically, we employ three more dependent variables by using data on the share of income 
in the highest and lowest 10% of the income distribution, respectively, as well as data on the 
poverty gap at $1.25 a day. The first two variables provide more detailed information on the 
distribution of income, and the third is a direct proxy for poverty. We should state, however, 
that these indicators have a number of shortcomings.  
First, advanced economies only have one or two years of this data, and thus we have to 
exclude these countries from our sample. This introduces selectivity bias in the results and 
reduces the number of available observations. For these variables, our sample includes 
information from 56 countries. Second, unlike our Gini index, the measures of inequality from 
the WDI are constructed on the basis of either income or consumption and are not 
standardized. Therefore, the values for these variables are not directly comparable across 
countries (for details, see Solt, 2009). Finally, some countries report different values for urban 
and rural populations. For them we have to take averages, which essentially introduce some 
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measurement error. Yet, the findings still provide insights on what drives the relationship 
between banking-sector liberalization and income distribution.                 
 
2.2 BANK REGULATIONS AND THEIR IMPACT ON INCOME INEQUALITY 
Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2010) describe in detail the regulatory conditions that 
characterize the banking industries in 91 countries over the period 1973-2005. They offer 
seven indices of financial-sector policy that compose a single general indicator of financial 
reform. For each index, a country receives a score on a graded scale, with zero corresponding 
to “fully repressed,” one to “partially repressed,” two to “largely liberalized,” and three to 
“fully liberalized.” Here we drop four countries for which we have no information on other 
important variables in our empirical analysis.  
Table AI in the internet Appendix groups the 87 countries in our final sample by 
region. Also, this table shows the extent to which countries across these regions liberalized 
their banking systems over the period 1997-2005. Most countries (55 in total) reformed their 
banking systems; 29 countries maintained the status quo. Of the 29, eight had a fully 
liberalized banking sector by 2005. Finally, note that the different types of liberalization 
policies cluster across countries. That is, countries that liberalize one aspect of their banking 
sector tend to liberalize other aspects simultaneously or quickly after. Thus, the seven 
subindices tend to move together on a country-specific basis.      
The first of the seven subindices relates to credit controls, such as credit directed 
toward favored sectors or industries, ceilings on credit in other sectors, and excessively high 
reserve requirements. The second index documents interest rate controls, including whether 
the government directly controls interest rates, or whether floors, ceilings, or interest-rate 
bands exist. The third index considers entry barriers, such as licensing requirements, limits on 
the participation of foreign banks, and activity restrictions relating to bank specialization or 
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establishing universal banks. The fourth index considers the prudential regulation and 
supervision of the banking sector. It encompasses regulatory policies pertaining to capital 
regulation, compliance with Basel guidelines, the degree of independence and legal power of 
the supervisory agency, and the authorities’ effectiveness in imposing the legal framework. 
The fifth index quantifies the share of banking-sector assets that the state controls; we refer to 
this as the extent of privatization in the banking sector. The sixth index considers policies 
relating to international capital flows, such as restrictions on capital- and current-account 
convertibility, and the use of multiple exchange rates. The final index documents policies 
relating to securities markets. Included here are operational restrictions, such as restrictions on 
staffing, branching, and advertising. Establishing new securities markets is also in this 
category. We provide notations for these indices in Table I. 
Even though Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2010) label the general indicator a 
“financial reforms index,” it primarily reflects policies related to the banking sector. In the 
empirical analysis we examine the effects each of the seven pillars have on income inequality, 
as well as the effect of the aggregate index, which is the sum of the seven indices and is 
labeled as "banking regulations." Fortunately, the database of Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel 
(2010) covers a large number of countries over a lengthy time period, whereas previous 
indices (e.g., Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2006; Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2003; or the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development index of banking-sector reforms) are 
smaller in terms of years and/or countries. This large coverage makes our study possible and 
diminishes concerns about the number of available observations. 
 Theoretically, different forms of banking regulation can affect the distribution of 
income in different ways. For example, more stringent capital requirements and the efficient 
enforcement of prudential bank supervision (related to the fourth index) usually aim at 
reducing systemic risk and thereby buffer the economy from financial crises. If crises hurt 
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primarily the poor, however, and if capital regulation lowers systemic risk, then capital 
regulation should lower income inequality. Repullo and Suarez (2008, 2009) highlight this 
procyclical effect of banking regulations in general and of Basel II in particular. Given that the 
majority of the related literature seems to agree that a negative correlation exists between the 
two (Barlevy and Tsiddon, 2006), then a negative correlation should also exist between 
banking regulations and inequality. In contrast, based on the fact that capital requirements 
exist in both good and bad times and that capital is expensive, more stringent capital 
requirements may raise banks’ incentives to lend to "safer" individuals and firms rather than 
to relatively poor individuals, even if they are creditworthy or will generate income with the 
capital. This would be especially true when the financial system and the economy are 
“anxious” (Fostel and Geanakoplos, 2008). 
In turn, the superior ability to enforce the abolition of interest rate and entry 
requirements (indices 2 and 3), the privatization of banks (index 5), and the liberalization and 
transparency of capital-account transactions (index 6) should improve financial intermediation 
services and project screening and monitoring. This would also give banks the liquidity to 
fund good investment ideas from individuals across the full spectrum of the income 
distribution, yielding a narrower income distribution and lower inequality (Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt and Levine, 2007).  
The same outcome will prevail if enhanced privatizations, looser entry requirements, 
and liberalized capital-account transactions guarantee a more competitive and efficient 
banking sector. A bank's market power is usually associated with relationship lending, higher 
interest-rate margins, and entry restrictions, but these elements constitute barriers for 
individuals and firms with less collateral or poor credit. Therefore, we expect that abolishing 
interest rate controls and entry barriers, privatizing more banks, and liberalizing capital 
account transactions negatively relate to income inequality.  
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The potential impact of the liberalization of the securities markets on income 
inequality seems more difficult to predict. On one hand, liberalization enhances financial 
liquidity and increases the volume of lending. In line with the discussion of inequality, this 
would allow individuals at the lower end of the income distribution to have easier access to 
lending and capital and to fund their investment ideas more efficiently and at a lower cost. On 
the other hand, the recent financial crisis has shown that intense securitization leads banks to 
take excessive risk, which leads to a rise in the probability of bank failures. In particular, 
banks react to downturns by tightening their lending standards, which reduces lending to 
individuals with lower asset holdings and collateral. This would widen the distribution of 
income. In addition, liberalization could lead not to funding projects, but to investments in 
nontraditional activities. Thus, the overall impact of liberalized securities markets on income 
inequality is ambiguous. 
Note, however, the implicit assumption that a low level of institutional quality offsets 
increases in supervisory power (e.g., government corruption is high or bureaucratic quality is 
low) and/or inappropriate economic development; apparently, this is the case for developing 
countries that face higher absolute poverty (e.g., Laffont, 2005). Identifying which effects 
prevail becomes fundamentally an empirical issue.  
 
2.3 CONTROL VARIABLES 
The control variables in this study are from the extensive literature on the determinants of 
income inequality (e.g., Roine, Vlachos and Waldenström, 2009; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Levine, 2007). In particular, we control for a number of macroeconomic, institutional, 
demographic, and financial variables that affect income inequality. Because we use estimators 
based on fixed effects, we do not control for time-invariant variables. 
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 First, we use the log of GDP per capita to control for the level of economic 
development, the inflation rate to control for monetary conditions, and the log of the 
population size to control for the demographics in each country. Information for these 
variables is from the World Development Indicators (WDI).4 In keeping with the Kuznets 
hypothesis on the non-linear effect of economic development on income distribution, we also 
experiment by including the square of the log of GDP per capita.  
 Second, we control for trade openness and public sector growth. Our measure for trade 
openness is the sum of exports and imports as a share of GDP. Data come from the Penn 
World Table (PWT). The literature's empirical findings concerning the impact of trade 
openness on inequality are rather inconclusive. For example, trade openness increases income 
in standard Heckscher-Ohlin trade theory, but the extent to which it reduces inequality within 
countries remains questionable; most studies suggest an insignificant correlation (Easterly, 
2005; Roine, Vlachos, and Waldenström, 2009). In turn, to account for the activity and growth 
of government over the sample period, we include the ratio of central government 
expenditures as a share of GDP (data also taken from the PWT). Higher government spending 
may disproportionately help the poor if used efficiently, but when institutions are weak 
(primarily in developing countries), higher government spending may be wasteful. 
 Usually included in equations characterizing income inequality is a variable that 
characterizes education. Often, this variable, provided by Barro and Lee (2001), addresses 
years of schooling. We use this data on primary education. In further sensitivity analysis we 
multiply the Barro-Lee indicator by the educational quality indicator “cognitive” developed 
by Hanushek and Woessmann (2009). The “cognitive” indicator is constructed on the basis of 
                                                 
4 We also experiment with other macroeconomic variables, such as the unemployment and the GDP growth rate, 
a number of interest rates, the capacity utilization rate, etc. The results on our banking-regulation variables 
remain practically unchanged.  
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student performance in internationally comparable achievements tests5 and allows us to 
capture potential qualitative differences on education among different countries. We find 
quantitatively similar results.   
 Furthermore, in order to purify the relationship between bank regulations and 
inequality from elements pertaining to the characteristics of the financial environment, we use 
two relevant control variables. As a proxy for the level of liquidity, we use the ratio of bank 
deposits to bank credit. The higher this ratio is, the higher the Bank liquidity variable. A 
higher liquidity ratio also indicates lower dependence on the banking sector in that country, as 
it reflects higher financial depth; thus, we expect it to relate negatively to inequality. In 
addition, we use a dummy variable, Bank crisis, which equals 1 when a country experiences a 
banking crisis.6 We expect that banking crises widen the distribution of income by having a 
marginally more significant effect on the poor.7   
Finally, we control for a number of political and institutional variables. In particular, 
we use information on the political orientation of the government in place (left or right) to 
examine whether left-leaning governments yield a narrower income distribution. In addition, 
we include an overall index of freedom (that excludes financial freedom) to guarantee that our 
                                                 
5 Although varying across the individual assessments, testing covers math, science, and reading for three 
age/grade groups: primary education (age 9/10), lower secondary education (age 13 to 15), and the final year of 
secondary education (generally grade 12 or 13). For more information on how this variable is constructed, see 
the Appendix of Hanushek and Woessmann (2009). 
6 On this front, a recent line of research suggests that banking crises may in fact be endogenous to inequality 
(e.g., Atkinson and Morelli, 2011; Kumhof and Ranciere, 2010; Stiglitz, 2009). The hypothesis comes from 
Stiglitz (2009), who suggests that in the face of stagnating real incomes, households in the lower part of the 
distribution borrow excessively to maintain a rising standard of living. Yet, in our case, we have 14 cases of 
banking crises during the period 1997-2005, most of which are related to the Asian crisis of 1997 and the 
Russian crisis of 1998. A significant common factor behind these crises is exchange rates, which do not have 
much to do with excess household borrowing. Still, we consider instrumenting the banking crisis dummy 
variable with the ratio of M2 to foreign exchange reserves of the central bank or with the share of public 
ownership of banks, both of which are significant determinants of banking crises in previous studies (e.g., 
Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998, 2005) and do not seem to affect economic inequality. The results remain 
practically the same and are available on request. 
7 We also experiment with variables characterizing the mobility of funds across countries (ratio of offshore bank 
deposits to domestic bank deposits), the capitalization of the stock market (ratio of stock market capitalization to 
GDP), the performance of the banking sector (ratio of profits to total assets), the concentration in the banking 
sector (three-bank concentration ratio), etc. Most of these variables are only marginally correlated to our 
inequality measures and do not affect the impact of the banking regulations.  
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banking-regulation variables do not capture the overall political-liberalization processes that 
might have occurred within a country. Further, the presence of quality institutions will 
probably tend to lower inequality, even though strong endogenous effects may prevail in this 
relationship (Chong and Gradstein, 2007). Indeed, quality institutions might enhance the 
impact of regulations on the distribution of income and weaker institutions may undermine 
such an impact. To characterize the quality of institutions, we use the Law and Order and the 
Transparency (the inverse of Corruption) indices of the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG).8 For explicit definitions of all these variables, see Table I; for descriptive statistics, 
see Table II; for a correlation matrix, see Table AII in the internet Appendix. 
 
3. Econometric Identification 
The empirical model is of the following form: 
, 1 , 1 2 , 3 , ,i t i t i t i t t i i ty a y a r a x v u      ,       (1) 
where y is a measure of income inequality observed in country i at time t, r is the set of 
variables characterizing different types of banking regulations, x is the vector of control 
variables explaining y, u is the stochastic term, and λ and v are time- and country-effects, 
respectively.9 The model could be dynamic due to persistence in inequality. 
We seek a robust method to identify how bank regulations affect income inequality. 
The primary identification issue is the potential endogeneity of r. The major concern here is 
not that income inequality influences the choice of bank regulation (reverse causality), but 
that factors that influence banking regulation are also correlated with changes in income 
                                                 
8 We also employ variables pertaining to democratic accountability, property rights, etc. However, these tend to 
be highly correlated among themselves and with the GDP per Capita variable.  
9 We keep the basic econometric model in levels because the time dimension of the dataset is small but the cross-
sectional dimension is relatively large. Thus, we mitigate concerns about potential serial correlation of the error 
term. Using a correction of the error terms when applying instrumental variables and GMM also mitigates these 
concerns.   
  16 
inequality. For example, the macroeconomic environment may simultaneously determine both 
elements (see e.g., Evans, 1997).  
Likewise, Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2008) discuss two important episodes of large 
changes in the indices of banking regulation. First, Mexico responded to its 1994 crisis by 
easing restrictions on banks, but Argentina implemented greater regulatory restrictions after 
its crisis. Thus, if major economic turmoil drives changes in banking regulation, we should 
expect changes in banking regulation to correlate with changes in income inequality. This will 
happen as long as economic turmoil affects inequality. Moreover, this type of endogeneity 
will be relevant if politics drive changes in banking regulation, because changes in political 
equilibrium affect both regulatory reforms and other policies that influence income 
distribution. 
 To solve this problem, one can follow two strategies. The first is to focus on a specific 
episode and type of banking regulation and identify its impact on inequality within a single-
country study. This strategy is the essence of Beck, Levine, and Levkov (2010). The second 
strategy identifies a clear source of change in banking regulations that is not highly correlated 
with political and economic sources of income inequality. This strategy allows for examining 
different types of regulation within a single empirical model. However, this comes at the cost 
of identifying proper instruments—a very difficult problem indeed.  
 Identifying a proper instrumental variable means ruling out institutional characteristics 
because of the potential causality with political reforms and thus with income inequality. The 
same holds for the legal-origin variables that many studies use in growth equations. The 
literature also uses geographic elements to identify growth equations, but establishing 
geographic elements as a source of banking regulation seems rather arbitrary.  
Another intuitive approach is to consider the structural elements of the banking sector 
as potential elements affecting banking regulations. In particular, regulators might be 
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interested in shaping banking industry concentration, given the trade-off between efficiency 
and concentration or concerns regarding foreign competition for domestic banks. The same 
may hold for the liquidity provided in the economic system and the importance of the banking 
sector in providing credit to the economy. Unfortunately, these elements may affect (or be 
affected by) economic outcomes, and through them, inequality. 
An interesting case comes from elements of regulation not in the index of Abiad, 
Detragiache, and Tressel (2010). Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006) and updates of this 
database are an exceptionally rich source of information on this front. From the various 
indices they discuss, we focus on the index named Supervisory power. This index indicates 
whether supervisory authorities can prevent and correct problems in the banking sector. 
Therefore, more supervisory powers reflect more stringent regulation of operational banking 
procedures.  
Because these procedures deal primarily with corporate governance issues of everyday 
banking, they should not have any substantial real effects on income inequality. This is 
substantiated by statistical analysis showing a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between official supervisory power and financial reforms. This index bears no 
effect on any of our inequality indices.  
Table AII reports pairwise correlation coefficients between Supervisory power and the 
indices from the database by Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2010). The equivalent 
correlation coefficients between Supervisory power and our inequality measures are very low 
(-0.046 with the Gini coefficient and 0.004 with the Theil index). In addition, OLS regressions 
between our inequality measures and Supervisory power, with or without country fixed and 
time effects, indicate no causality running from supervisory power to the inequality measures. 
Therefore, we use Supervisory power as our instrumental variable. Note that this variable is 
available from 1997 onward, which is why our empirical analysis based on conventional 
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econometric procedures is restricted to the period 1997-2005. However, as we show in Table 
AI, this is still a period of significant banking reforms in many regions of the world.10 
 Given the persistence of inequality and the presence of the dynamic term yt-1 among 
the regressors, we have to use the generalized method of moments (GMM) for dynamic panels 
along with two-stage least squares (2SLS). However, the latter is also an efficient estimator 
given that we primarily resort to three-year averages of the data. Also, 2SLS allows using 
fixed effects that might improve the precision of our estimates (see e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, 
Robinson and Yared, 2008). In turn, the GMM procedure is the system GMM estimator of 
Blundell and Bond (1998).  
This method assumes that lagged values of the dependent and independent variables 
are valid instruments under certain restrictions. In our setting, however, including lagged 
values of r and x as additional instruments might not be a good idea. Political and institutional 
variables change slowly, and previous changes might correlate with contemporaneous levels 
of inequality. Thus, in the equations estimated by GMM, we only include lagged levels of y 
among the instrumental variables.11 With these issues in mind, we turn to the estimation 
results.      
 
4. Empirical Findings  
In this section we present the main results of the study and conduct various sensitivity 
analyses to assess whether results change (i) when choosing between the Gini coefficient or 
the Theil index, (ii) for different levels of economic development, (iii) when including 
                                                 
10 A potential drawback of this instrumental variable could be that it reflects the presence of influential socio-
economic elites, which can have a direct effect on income inequality. We experiment with many potential 
measures of elites (see e.g., Angeles, 2007; Angeles and Neanidis, 2009). Using variables that capture the 
presence of an influential elite as in Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2006) and Morck, Yavuz, and Yeung (2011) we 
find that the correlations between these measures and the supervisory power index are very low and statistically 
insignificant.    
11 In a previous version of this paper we also used a panel VAR approach, in the fashion of Love and Zichinno 
(2006) and Holtz-Eakin, Newey, and Rosen (1988) to identify the isolated impact of bank regulations on 
inequality. The analysis was carried out for the full 1973-2005 period using annual data. In general, the results 
were similar to the ones reported below and are available on request. 
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alternative control variables among the regressors, (iv) when using annual, three-, and nine-
year intervals for the data, (v) when employing the different estimation methods proposed 
earlier, and (vi) when dropping each region defined in Table AI in turn.12 
 
4.1 BANK REGULATIONS AND INCOME INEQUALITY: RESULTS FOR THE EFFECT 
OF THE GENERAL INDICATOR OF BANK REGULATIONS 
Panels with large cross-sectional and relatively small time dimensions are usually prone to 
considerable heteroskedasticity, and a simple likelihood ratio test shows that our panel is no 
exception. Therefore, in applying 2SLS or GMM we use robust standard errors. The first set 
of empirical results is in Table III, where the dependent variable is the Gini coefficient and the 
main explanatory variable is the aggregate index of banking regulations.  
We start with a simple OLS regression, with country fixed effects and robust standard 
errors, of banking regulation on the Gini coefficient. The result poses an immediate challenge, 
as it shows that regulations increase income inequality. Of course, this finding is 
counterintuitive and probably driven by omitted-variable and endogeneity bias. In the second 
regression (column 2) we add simple time effects, and the impact of bank regulations on the 
Gini coefficient becomes insignificant.  
[INSERT TABLE III] 
Following our discussion in Section 3, we turn to identification through instrumental 
variables techniques. In columns (3) to (5) we report the results from a 2SLS regression with 
country fixed and time effects, as well as robust standard errors. The instrument used is the 
index of Supervisory power (defined in Table I). We report the first-stage results for these 
regressions in the lower part of Table III. The results show that the Supervisory power 
                                                 
12 Another drawback to the empirical analysis is that outliers drive results. To determine whether our results are 
sensitive to outliers, we perform a jackknife analysis (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993). This involves estimating the 
initial equation by excluding in each replication one or more cross-sectional units (countries). Our results are 
robust to the exclusion of particular observations that yield extreme estimates; hence, outliers do not substantially 
affect the main implications of the paper. 
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variable is a negative and highly statistically significant determinant of banking regulation, 
which is in line with our expectations. As discussed in Section 3, this instrument is an 
insignificant determinant of the Gini coefficient in a simple fixed-effects regression with 
robust standard errors and time effects. The full array of the first-stage results is available on 
request.     
The second-stage results in column (3) show that higher Bank regulations values 
(reflecting a more liberalized banking system) are associated with lower Gini values, and this 
effect is statistically significant at the 5% level. The economic effect is also substantial. 
According to the results of column (3), a one-point increase in Bank regulations lowers the 
Gini coefficient by 5.2%. In Lithuania, for example, the 3.6-point rise in Bank regulations 
over the sample period is equivalent to an 18.7% reduction in the Gini coefficient, ceteris 
paribus. Therefore, the slight increase in the Gini, from an average of 47.19 in the period 
1997-1999 to an average 47.75 in the period 2003-2005, would have been much higher if the 
banking sector had not been liberalized.  
In India, Bank regulations rises by 3.5 points. The associated reduction in Gini is 
18.2%, ceteris paribus. Here, the Gini coefficient rises from an average of 39.5 in the period 
1997-1999 to an average 43.5 in the period 2003-2005, and it would have been lower in the 
latter period if the only driving force were banking liberalization policies. In general, and 
given that the Gini coefficient trends upward in most countries, the liberalization of banking 
systems contains this upward trend by creating opportunities for those at the lower end of the 
income distribution. Furthermore, if we assume that the relationship between banking sector 
reforms and the Gini coefficient is stable over time, the cumulative benefit would be much 
higher after the banking sector reforms initiated in the 1980s. It remains to be seen whether all 
types of bank regulation contribute to this effect. 
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In columns (4) and (5) we add more explanatory variables. The statistical and 
economic significance of Bank regulations remain practically unchanged. Among the rest of 
the explanatory variables, the most interesting results are those showing a negative effect 
between (i) the log of GDP per Capita and Gini, (ii) between Bank Liquidity and Gini, and 
(iii) between Education and Gini. In the literature, the relationship between economic 
development and inequality is primarily negative (Bourguignon, 1996), but controlling for the 
impact of the economic development seems crucial because the Bank regulations variable 
may capture the positive trend in development. Yet, the coefficient on Bank regulations 
remains significant, even though GDP per Capita enters with a negative and significant 
coefficient.  
Similarly, the impact of Bank regulations on inequality does not change when 
controlling for the increasing loans to deposits ratio, even though a higher ratio translates to a 
narrower distribution of income. Finally, we find that the higher the level of primary 
education, the lower the inequality. This finding has ample support in the relevant literature 
(e.g., Barro, 1999).     
In columns (6) to (8) we report the results of re-estimating the previous three 
regressions, this time using GMM for dynamic panels. The model now includes the lagged 
dependent variable yt-1, and as an additional instrument, yt-2. The identification tests show no 
overidentifying restrictions and no serial correlation between the instruments and the 
disturbance. Compared to columns (3) to (5), the results remain practically unchanged.  
The impact of Bank regulations on the Gini coefficient is negative and significant. The 
relevant coefficient is around 0.05, very close to the one observed when the estimation 
method is 2SLS. One difference in the results, however, is the positive and significant 
coefficient on Trade Openness in column (9). This finding suggests that globalization is 
partially responsible for the widening income distribution; however, to make such a statement 
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one has to go much deeper. Here, we only document that the impact of bank regulations on 
inequality is not primarily due to some form of trade openness.      
In Table IV we measure inequality via the Theil index and rerun specifications (1) to 
(5) of Table III. We are unable to estimate the model using GMM for dynamic panels, 
because only two periods of data are available for the Theil index (1997-1999 and 2000-
2002). Again, and despite the reduced number of observations, Bank regulations enters with a 
negative and significant coefficient. However, the estimated elasticity is somewhat larger. For 
example, in columns (4) and (5), which represent regressions with controls, the relevant 
coefficients are -0.088 and -0.083, respectively.  
These findings confirm that regulatory stringency increases income inequality, despite 
whether the inequality is in household income or individual income. More important, the fact 
that Bank regulations has a larger impact on the Theil index than on the Gini coefficient 
suggests that much of the effect of bank liberalization on income inequality comes from wage 
income, which the Theil index encompasses rather than the Gini. Notably, this finding is in 
line with Beck et al. (2010). Among the rest of the controls, the most significant ones remain 
the GDP per Capita and Bank Liquidity variables.   
[INSERT TABLE IV] 
 We conduct further sensitivity analyses on these results and report the findings in 
Table V. Because the results from choosing between 2SLS or GMM and between the Gini 
coefficient or the Theil index are not different, we only report the results from the 
computationally simpler 2SLS and from the Gini coefficient. In column (1) we introduce a 
multiplicative term between Bank regulations and GDP per Capita to examine whether the 
impact of Bank regulations differs with the level of economic development. In this 
specification we mean-center the variables and find the product of the demeaned terms. This 
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allows for examining the effect of Bank regulations at the average GDP per Capita (and not 
for GDP per Capita equal to 0, which is not interesting) and reduces multicollinearity.  
A series of important contributions (e.g., Estache and Wren-Lewis, 2009) view 
economic and institutional development as prerequisites for regulations to have a real effect 
on the economy. In fact, as Bourguignon (2005) states, “Today, it is increasingly recognized 
that, in many circumstances, the problem [in the developing countries] was that reformers 
disregarded the functioning of regulatory institutions, assuming implicitly they would work as 
in developed countries.”13 The results show that the literature’s implications are valid: the 
negative impact of bank regulations on inequality weakens substantially for countries with 
low GDP per capita.    
[INSERT TABLE V]   
In column (2) we introduce the squared term of GDP per capita among the regressors 
to examine whether a nonlinear relationship between GDP per capita and inequality (Kuznets 
hypothesis) affects the results. Again, we mean-center the involved variable. We do not find 
evidence of nonlinearity, which is in line with Deininger and Squire (1998). A further 
robustness check includes the initial Gini coefficient and its squared term as in Clarke, Xu, 
and Zhu (2006); we also use an estimation method based on random effects. Even in this 
exercise, the relevant coefficients turn out to be statistically insignificant. The latter findings 
are available on request. 
In columns (3) and (4) we introduce the institutional and political variables, 
respectively. This guarantees that the Bank regulations variable does not capture any general 
institutional characteristics of countries or the general political freedom or ideology of the 
specific time frame. Here we remove the macroeconomic variables because of high 
correlations between them and the institutional and political variables. The findings show that 
                                                 
13 We also experiment with the product of our regulatory variables with the institutional variables (i.e., 
Bureaucratic Quality and Law & Order). However, as shown in Table IV, these variables are highly correlated 
with the GDP per Capita variable and inference is unaltered.  
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lower Gini coefficients are associated with stronger institutions and more political freedom. 
Left-leaning governments are associated with lower Gini coefficients, but the effect is not 
significant at conventional levels. The impact of Bank regulations is in fact stronger in these 
specifications, and the coefficients obtain a value of 6% and above.  
In column (5) we examine whether the results differ when we estimate our basic 
specification only for bank-based economies. To define bank-based economies (as opposed to 
market-based ones) we use the ratio of private credit provided by banks to stock market 
capitalization (for a similar definition, see Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine and Beck, 2002). Countries 
with ratios below the mean value of this variable are bank-based economies.14  
The results show that the negative impact of bank regulations on income inequality for 
these countries is much stronger. As the relevant coefficient indicates, a one-point increase in 
Bank regulations decreases the Gini coefficient by 10.6%. For India, which is a bank-based 
economy, Bank regulations rises by 3.5 points. The associated reduction in Gini over the 
sample period is 37.1%, ceteris paribus, which is a very large effect.  
The respective effect on market-based economies is only 2.6% per point increase in 
Bank regulations, with the effect being statistically significant only at the 10% level (results 
are available on request). Therefore, for Chile, which is a market-based economy and saw a 
rise in Bank regulations of 2.33 points, the respective reduction in inequality is approximately 
6%. This shows that bank regulations can control income inequality in both groups, but 
mostly in bank-based economies.    
The results discussed so far are robust for the three-year time periods. Thus, we 
examine whether the results hold for one- and nine-year time intervals, and we report the 
findings in columns (6) and (7) of Table V. With very few differences, the findings are 
equivalent to those of previous regressions. When we use annual data, most of the coefficients 
                                                 
14 Admittedly this is only one of the many measures that could define bank- versus market-based economies. 
However, more analyses on this front are beyond the scope of the study. 
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show stronger effects, which is probably due to the higher number of observations and the 
short-run fluctuations of variables. Similarly, the coefficients in column (7) are between those 
reported in column (6) and those of the baseline specifications in Table III. 
In an important robustness check, we consider the impact of incorporating the standard 
errors assigned by Solt (2009) on the Gini coefficients (see our discussion in footnote 2). We 
proceed in two ways. The first involves dropping the coefficients for countries with standard 
errors higher than 5 (40 observations in the three-year panel). The second, which is the 
preferred method, involves generating Monte Carlo simulations for the Gini index and 
perform the analysis using the output of these simulations (see Solt, 2009). The results from 
both methods are similar, and we report the results from the preferred method in column (8) of 
Table V. Changes in the results are minimal compared with those of Table III.   
Given that the results are somewhat different for bank- versus market-based 
economies, another robustness check examines whether countries from a particular region 
drive the results. For example, Table AI shows that 29% of the sample countries are advanced 
economies and 42% of the countries that have reformed their banking systems are transition 
countries. In Table AIII in the internet Appendix, we report the results of the Gini coefficient 
regressions, where we exclude from the full sample one region in turn. Changes in the results 
are minimal and still reflect that for every 1% increase in Bank regulations there is at least a 
5% reduction in the Gini index.  
 In Table VI we report the results from using as dependent variables (i) the income 
share held by the highest 10% of the income distribution, (ii) the income share held by the 
lowest 10%, and (iii) the poverty gap at $1.25 a day, respectively. These regressions show 
whether banking sector reforms disproportionately benefit or hurt the poor and whether they 
affect the absolute level of poverty significantly.  
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Columns (1), (3), and (5) report the regression results that include only bank 
regulations, as well as fixed and time effects. In the regressions in columns (2), (4), and (6) we 
add all the other explanatory variables as in specification (5) of Table III. The results show 
that banking liberalization primarily increases the income share of the relatively poor. Further, 
the impact of the Bank regulations variable on the poverty gap at $1.25 a day is negative and 
significant at the 10% level. In column (4) the economic effect is quite large, as a 1% increase 
in Bank regulations increases the income share held by the lowest 10% of the income 
distribution by 0.5 percentage points. In other words, even a moderate increase in Bank 
regulations from 16 to 17.6, which we see in many countries over the sample period, will see 
a 0.53 point increase in the income share held by the lowest 10% of the income distribution. 
This implies that if the income share held by the lowest 10% initially is 2.41 (i.e., 
approximately equal to the mean value), the income share will increase to 2.94 within three 
years.        
[INSERT TABLE VI] 
These findings are in line with Galor and Moav (2004), who argue that failing to 
liberalize the banking sector hurts the poor. The impact of banking sector liberalization on the 
income share held by the top 10% of the income distribution is positive and significant at the 
10% level, which shows that banking sector reforms do not hurt the relatively rich; in fact, 
such reforms marginally improve their income share.  
This finding seems to follow Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990). Their theoretical 
model predicts that in transition economies, accelerating financial development is likely to 
encourage intermediaries to lend to individuals and firms with higher accumulated wealth. 
Strong political networks and abrupt liberalization of product markets could further enhance 
this mechanism, a situation in countries with relatively weak institutions (such as the ones in 
these regressions). However, and given our discussion, our results overall conflict with the 
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Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) model in that the poor benefit more than the rich from 
banking liberalization.  
A final element is that the Bank crisis dummy is significant for the first time, which 
shows that banking crises hurt both the highest and the lowest incomes but more significantly 
hurt the poor. However, interpret these results with caution because, as discussed, the values 
of the dependent variables are not observed in Western-type economies and are not directly 
comparable across countries. The first element reduces the number of available observations 
and introduces selectivity bias; the second element introduces some measurement error.      
 We repeat this exercise for the regional groups in Tables AI and AIII. We exclude the 
advanced economies because data for the income-distribution variables are very limited for 
these countries. We report in Table AIV of the internet Appendix the coefficient estimates and 
the associated robust standard errors on the Bank regulations variable. The picture is not very 
different from the one reported in Table VI. The impact of Bank regulations on the income 
share of the relatively rich (reported in panel A) seems to lose ground in statistical 
significance when we exclude the groups of countries with the larger number of observations 
(especially Latin America and transition countries). In contrast, the coefficients reflecting the 
impact of Bank regulations on the income share held by the lowest 10% remain positive and 
strongly significant when we exclude one regional group in turn (see results in Panel B). 
Finally, four out of five regressions in Panel C indicate that banking sector liberalization 
lowers the poverty gap at $1.25 a day; this effect is statistically significant at the 10% level.  
Overall, this analysis highlights that a clear trade-off exists between stricter banking 
regulation and long-term income equality, and although a consensus seems to indicate that 
stricter regulatory policies promote stable banking systems, these policies still 
disproportionately hurt the poor. This finding is in line with Beck, Levine, and Levkov 
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(2010), which shows that deregulating the banking system in the United States in the 1970s 
and 1980s led to increased incomes, particularly for the poor. 
 
4.2 BANK REGULATIONS AND INCOME INEQUALITY: RESULTS FOR THE EFFECT 
OF THE DIFFERENT REGULATORY POLICIES 
Do all types of regulation have the same impact on income inequality? It seems highly 
unlikely, and the results in this subsection confirm this. To save space, we only report the 
results from the equivalent regression (5) of Table III, using each one of the seven 
components of the Bank regulations variable as independent variables. The rest of the 2SLS 
regressions and regressions based on the Theil index confirm these findings.  
 In Table VII we present the results using each one of the seven components of the 
bank regulations index in Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2010) as the main independent 
variable. All individual subindices (with the exception of the liberalization of security 
markets) have a negative and significant effect on the Gini index.  The most significant 
impact, both statistically and economically, comes from liberalizing interest rate controls and 
privatizating the banking sector. In contrast, liberalizing security markets seems to have a 
positive impact on income inequality.  
[INSERT TABLE VII]  
The impact of credit and interest rate controls on the Gini coefficient (see columns 1 
and 2, respectively) is negative and statistically significant. The coefficient on Credit controls 
is -0.055, whereas the coefficient on Interest rate controls is even higher (-0.092). The results 
imply that credit controls lower liquidity and work against the poor. This seems 
straightforward considering that higher restrictions tend to produce less competitive markets, 
which tend to reduce the quality of project screening and monitoring. Under these conditions, 
  29 
relationship lending or lending to well-established firms with high levels of collateral and 
strong credit history prevail, thereby constraining access to credit for the relatively poor.    
The impact of entry barriers is negative but statistically insignificant only at the 10% 
level, but the impact of privatization is negative and significant at the 1% level. Given that 
most developed countries abolished entry restrictions by the early 1990s, the developing and 
transition markets probably contribute to the relatively weak relationship between entry 
barriers and income inequality. In addition, these economies are usually characterized by 
inferior institutions and the partial inability to enforce the law.15   
The relationship between the Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2010) index of banking 
supervision and income inequality is also negative (column 4). This is a very interesting 
finding, given the ongoing discussion on the reregulation of the banking system. As discussed, 
a higher index value reflects more stringent capital regulation, more monitoring of bank 
activities through audits and sanctions for prudential purposes, etc. Thus, this finding supports 
the position that improved screening and monitoring of investment projects and more 
competition in banking markets drives funds to the best investment ideas and thus provides 
equal opportunities to the poor. Hence, financial stabilization aside, efficient supervision also 
seems to have a substantial, real, and positive effect in lessening income inequality, thus 
allowing equal opportunities in accessing credit and sustaining economic fairness.  
A final notable result in Table VII is the positive, albeit relatively small, response of 
the Gini coefficient to a shock in securities markets (see column 7). This finding suggests that 
liberalizing securities markets leads to higher income inequality. A mechanism that explains 
this finding might be that banks gradually lend more after liberalization of credit and interest 
rates, but they also expand their involvement in securities markets to safeguard themselves 
                                                 
15 In additional analysis, we run a panel VAR, which distinguishes between countries with GDPs per capita 
above the sample mean and those below it. A Gini response to a positive shock in entry barriers and 
privatizations is more significant in countries with GDP per capita above our sample’s average. The results are 
available on request. 
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against the higher credit risk. This suggests a trade-off between liquidity going to securities 
markets and liquidity available to finance investment projects. That is, when banks become 
more involved in the securities markets, they tend to fund fewer projects (especially involving 
individuals with less collateral and credit history), which widens income distribution. 
As a final exercise, we re-estimate equations with the Theil index, the income share 
held by the highest 10% of the income distribution, and the income share held by the lowest 
10%. Similar to the previous table, we distinguish between the different sources of bank 
liberalization policies. Because this implies estimating 21 regressions, we report in Table AV 
in the internet Appendix only the results on the coefficients related to the regulatory indices.  
The results are somewhat weaker. This probably comes from the lower number of 
available observations and/or the lower quality of the WDI data for the income distribution 
variables. Still, credit and interest rate controls, as well as privatization policies, are associated 
with a lower Theil index. Liberalizing securities markets tends to increase the Theil index, but 
this effect lightens in statistical and economic significance. Among the different liberalization 
policies, abolishing entry barriers and enhancing international capital flows increase the 
income share of the relatively rich considerably. However, this is not at the expense of the 
poor: none of the seven indices has a negative and significant coefficient on the regressions 
with the income share of the lowest 10% as the dependent variable.  
In contrast, liberalizing credit and interest rate controls, as well as increasing 
international capital flows are the main sources of an increase in the income share of the poor 
(see columns 1, 2, and 6 of Panel C). Even though these findings should be treated with some 
caution, their interpretation is quite clear: the liberalization policies considered here do not 
take a toll on the income share of the poor; in fact, quite a few policies, especially those 
directly associated with credit availability and its pricing, increase it.  
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Overall, these findings imply something that the regulatory literature overlooks: bank 
regulation can, successfully in many circumstances, strengthen the financial system and 
absorb failures that lead to crises. Furthermore, most banking liberalization policies enhance 
the availability of credit, provide funding opportunities, and lead to a narrower income 
distribution. However, regulatory policies aimed at short-term financial stability (such as 
higher capital requirements) or short-term liquidity (such as liberalizing securities markets) 
have an adverse long-term effect on income equality.   
 
5. Conclusions and Policy Considerations 
This study links, for the first time, the full array of banking regulations with income 
inequality. We show that the banking liberalization policies contribute significantly to 
containing income inequality. Yet, the pattern is not similar across all regulatory policies, 
countries with different levels of economic and institutional development, and market-based 
versus bank-based economies.  
In particular, abolishing credit controls decreases income inequality substantially. 
Interest rate controls and tighter banking supervision also decrease income inequality. In turn, 
abolishing entry barriers and enhancing privatization laws seem to lower income inequality, 
primarily in developed countries. In contrast, liberalizing securities markets increases income 
inequality. These results are robust to a number of estimation methods that account, inter alia, 
for the endogeneity of banking regulations. 
 What are the policy implications of these findings? Bank regulations and associated 
reforms aim at enhancing the creditworthiness of banks and at improving the stability of the 
financial sector. Several studies over the last decade show that regulations do matter in 
shaping bank risk (e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2009; Agoraki, Delis, and Pasiouras, 2011), bank 
efficiency (Barth, Lin, Ma, Seade, and Song, 2010), and the probability of banking crises 
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(e.g., Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2008). Yet, what if bank regulations have other real effects 
on the economy? And more important, what if these real effects counteract the intended 
stabilizing effects? 
 Answering these questions requires consideration of two issues. First, the literature on 
the relationship between bank regulations and financial stability is inconclusive. In fact, 
different types of regulation may have opposing effects on financial stability, according to the 
existing research. Second, even if we assume that bank regulations lower banks' risk-taking 
appetites and enhance stability, the empirical findings here suggest that these effects are 
asymmetric and that certain liberalization policies (i.e., liberalizing securities markets) or 
reregulation policies actually increase income inequality. That is, banks pass the increased 
costs of higher risks onto the lower-income population that lacks good credit and collateral. It 
is a trade-off between banking stability and income equality. Given the contemporary 
discussion surrounding the rebirth of Glass-Steagall-type reforms in securities trading and 
Basel III discussions to increase banks’ risk-adjusted capital bases, there may be more to think 
about before taking those steps.   
 That said, three clear suggestions emerge from this paper and are consistent with Beck, 
Levine, and Levkov (2010). : First, liberalizing banking markets, primarily via efficient 
banking supervision and abolishing credit controls, helps the poor get easier access to credit. 
This in turn allows them to escape poverty and substantially raise their incomes. Second, 
appropriate prudential regulation should provide less costly incentives to banks to increase 
regulatory discipline without hurting the poor. Information technologies that lower the cost of 
transparency and more effective onsite supervision that enhance the integrity of the banking 
system may help achieve this goal. Finally, economies first need a certain level of economic 
and institutional development in order to obtain any positive effect from the abolishment of 
entry restrictions and privatizations on equality. Thus, though this type of deregulation had a 
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negative impact on inequality in the United States, this may not be true for countries with 
weak institutions in which socioeconomic elites directly affect bank supervisors’ decisions 
and policies.  
 Clearly more research is necessary. First and foremost, if data-quality concerns are 
dropped, researchers should study the effect of bank regulations on the incomes of individuals 
in the top and bottom of the income distribution. Another interesting extension relates to the 
potential impact of bank regulations on macroeconomic convergence (Evans and Karras, 
1996) or the speed of convergence (Evans, 1997). In addition, the interplay between 
regulations and their actual implementation may have more to say about credit availability and 
income inequality. Finally, more detailed datasets from both developed and developing 
countries could highlight the channels that may affect the nexus of bank regulations and 
income inequality, with an emphasis on the impact of banking crises. We leave these ideas for 
future research.  
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Table I. Variable definitions and sources 
 
The table reports notations, measures, and data sources for all the variables in the empirical analysis. 
Notation Measure Data Source 
   
A. Dependent Variables 
 
Gini 
coefficient  
Measure of inequality obtained from the Lorenz curve (natural 
logarithm) on the basis of household income before taxes. 
Standardized World 
Income Inequality 
Database by Solt (2009) 
 
Theil index  Wage inequality measure (natural logarithm) based on wage 
income. 
Texas Inequality Project 
and UTIP-UNIDO 
Industrial Statistics 
 
Income share 
held by highest 
10% 
 
The income share held by the highest 10% of the income 
distribution. 
 
World Development 
Indicators 
 
Income share 
held by lowest 
10% 
 
The income share held by the lowest 10% of the income 
distribution. 
 
World Development 
Indicators 
 
Poverty gap at 
$1.25 a day 
 
The mean shortfall from the poverty line (counting the non-poor 
as having zero shortfall), expressed as a percentage of the 
poverty line. This measure reflects the depth of poverty as well as 
its incidence. 
 
World Development 
Indicators 
   
B. Explanatory Variables 
 
Credit controls 
 
Index of liberalization of credit controls and reserve requirements 
for banks. Takes values between 0 and 3. The variable is used in 
logarithmic terms. 
 
 
Abiad et al. (2010) 
Interest rate 
controls 
Index of liberalization of interest rates. Takes values between 0 
and 3. The variable is used in logarithmic terms. 
 
Abiad et al. (2010) 
Entry barriers Index of lower entry barriers for banks. Takes values between 0 
and 3. The variable is used in logarithmic terms. 
 
Abiad et al. (2010) 
Banking 
supervision 
Index of prudential regulation and supervision of the banking 
sector. Takes values between 0 and 3. The variable is used in 
logarithmic terms. 
 
Abiad et al. (2010) 
Privatization Index of the extent of privatization of banks. Takes values 
between 0 and 3. The variable is used in logarithmic terms. 
 
Abiad et al. (2010) 
International 
capital flows 
Index of liberalization of international capital flows. Takes 
values between 0 and 3. The variable is used in logarithmic 
terms. 
 
Abiad et al. (2010) 
Securities 
markets 
Index of liberalization of securities markets. Takes values 
between 0 and 3. The variable is used in logarithmic terms. 
 
Abiad et al. (2010) 
Bank 
regulations 
This index is constructed on the basis of the sum of the values of 
the seven indices above, thus it takes values between 0 and 21. 
Higher values reflect more liberalized banking sectors. The 
variable is used in logarithmic terms. 
 
Abiad et al. (2010) 
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Population The natural logarithm of the population of a country. World Development 
Indicators (World Bank) 
 
GDP per capita The natural logarithm of the gross domestic product per capita. World Development 
Indicators (World Bank) 
 
Trade 
openness 
 
The ratio of the sum of exports and imports over GDP. Penn World Tables 6.3 
Government 
expenditure 
 
The ratio of government expenditures over GDP. The Heritage Foundation 
 
Inflation The CPI inflation rate. World Development 
Indicators (World Bank) 
 
Bank liquidity The ratio of bank deposits to bank credit. Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt 
(2009) 
 
Bank crisis 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 during a period that a banking crisis 
occurs. 
 
Laeven and Valencia 
(2008) 
Education Barro-Lee (2001) years of schooling. The variable is used in 
logarithmic terms. 
Barro and Lee (2001) 
 
Left power 
 
Chief executive and largest party in congress have left-center 
political orientation. 
 
 
Botero et al. (2004) 
Law and order Law and order are assessed separately, with each subcomponent 
worth 0 to 3 points. The law subcomponent is an assessment of 
the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the order 
subcomponent is an assessment of popular observance of the law. 
The variable is used in logarithmic terms. 
 
International Country Risk 
Guide 
Transparency Index of transparency (inverse of corruption), taking values from 
0 to 6. The higher the value of the index, the more transparent is 
the country. The variable is used in logarithmic terms. 
 
International Country Risk 
Guide 
Nonfinancial 
freedom 
Overall index of freedom minus the value on the financial 
freedom component. The variable is used in logarithmic terms. 
The Heritage Foundation 
 
 
C. Instrumental Variable 
 
Supervisory 
power  
 
Index of the powers of the supervisor of the banking sector, 
reflecting whether the supervisory agency has the authority to 
take specific actions to prevent and correct problems in the 
banking sector. The variable is used in logarithmic terms. 
 
Barth et al. (2006) and 
updates 
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Table II. Descriptive statistics and sample information 
 
The table reports the number of available observations and summary statistics (mean, standard 
deviation, minimum, and maximum) for the variables in the empirical analysis over the period 
1997-2005. The number of observations refers to the panel constructed by taking three-year 
averages. The variables are defined in Table I. Population is in thousands, and GDP per capita is 
in $US. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Gini coefficient 266 44.68 7.02 21.59 69.74 
Theil index 156 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.34 
Income share held by highest 10% 121 32.46 8.13 19.04 53.26 
Income share held by lowest 10% 121 2.41 1.04 0.20 4.52 
Poverty gap at $1.25 a day 101 7.05 10.35 0.21 52.76 
Credit controls 262 2.39 0.74 0.00 3.00 
Interest rate controls 262 2.78 0.54 0.00 3.00 
Entry barriers 262 2.62 0.71 0.00 3.00 
Banking supervision 262 1.67 0.79 0.00 3.00 
Privatization 262 1.81 1.13 0.00 3.00 
International capital flows 262 2.36 0.84 0.00 3.00 
Securities markets 262 2.15 0.84 0.00 3.00 
Bank regulations 262 15.78 3.56 5.00 21.00 
Population 293 42,800 145,000 78.8 1,300,000 
GDP per capita 293 10,820.12 10,988.35 299.67 66,165.13 
Trade openness 292 84.97 52.23 2.01 424.00 
Government expenditure 291 65.26 23.89 0.00 99.07 
Inflation 293 10.56 32.17 -7.17 359.87 
Bank liquidity 292 0.88 0.41 0.09 2.99 
Education 276 5.02 2.92 0.04 12.25 
Left power 237 0.55 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Law and order 275 3.96 1.33 1.00 6.00 
Transparency 275 3.30 1.43 0.29 6 
Nonfinancial freedom 262 52.41 18.98 10 90 
Supervisory power 286 11.01 2.22 4 14 
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Table III. Bank regulations and income inequality: Gini coefficient regressions 
 
The table reports coefficient estimates and robust standard errors (in parentheses) of the estimation of Equation (1) over the period 
1997-2005 using three-year averages. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the Gini coefficient. The explanatory 
variables are defined in Table I. Regressions (1) and (2) are estimated by OLS for panel data with country fixed effects and robust 
standard errors. Regressions (3)-(5) are estimated by 2SLS with country fixed effects, the instrumental variable being Supervisory 
power as defined in Table I. First-stage results for the instrumental variable are reported in the lower part of the table. Regressions 
(6)-(8) are estimated using GMM for dynamic panel data, and the second lag of Gini is added to Supervisory power as an 
instrumental variable. The overidentification test is the p-value of the Hansen J-statistic for the overidentification of the equation, 
and rejection of the null casts doubt on the validity of the instruments. AR2 test is the p-value of the test for second-order 
autocorrelation in first differences, and rejection of the null implies presence of such autocorrelation. The ***, **, and * marks 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS GMM GMM GMM 
Lagged Gini      0.552** 0.408** 0.472** 
      (0.235) (0.177) (0.184) 
Bank regulations 0.037*** 0.004 -0.052** -0.050** -0.048** -0.050** -0.052** -0.050** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
Population    -0.144*** -0.202***  0.017 0.006 
    (0.046) (0.043)  (0.029) (0.027) 
GDP per capita    -0.088*** -0.097***  -0.052*** -0.047** 
    (0.029) (0.026)  (0.018) (0.018) 
Trade openness    0.009 -0.030  0.081 0.057 
    (0.029) (0.022)  (0.049) (0.040) 
Government 
expenditure 
   0.028 0.022  0.040 0.024 
   (0.021) (0.029)  (0.038) (0.038) 
Inflation     0.006**   0.005** 
     (0.003)   (0.002) 
Bank liquidity     -0.026**   -0.036** 
     (0.012)   (0.015) 
Bank crisis     0.064   0.031 
     (0.067)   (0.105) 
Education     -0.248**   -0.264** 
     (0.107)   (0.108) 
Observations 260 260 260 254 241 260 254 241 
Time effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.145 0.264       
Overidentification test      0.340 0.332 0.325 
AR2 test      0.156 0.187 0.230 
 
First stage results 
        
Supervisory power   -0.471*** -0.382*** -0.380***    
   (0.105) (0.117) (0.117)    
R-squared   0.078 0.366 0.380    
F-statistic (p-value)   0.000 0.000 0.000    
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Table IV. Bank regulations and income inequality: Theil index regressions 
 
The table reports coefficient estimates and robust standard errors (in parentheses) of the 
estimation of Equation (1) over the period 1997-2002 using three-year averages. The 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the Theil index. The explanatory variables are 
defined in Table I. Regressions (1) and (2) are estimated by OLS for panel data with 
country fixed effects. Regressions (3)-(5) are estimated by 2SLS with country fixed effects 
and robust standard errors, the instrumental variable being Supervisory power as defined in 
Table I. First-stage results for the instrumental variable are reported in the lower part of the 
table. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Bank regulations 0.009 -0.012 -0.122*** -0.088** -0.083** 
 (0.028) (0.011) (0.043) (0.042) (0.041) 
Population    -0.215*** -0.205*** 
    (0.071) (0.051) 
GDP per capita    -0.086*** -0.082*** 
    (0.025) (0.025) 
Trade openness    0.016* 0.012 
    (0.009) (0.012) 
Government expenditure    0.016 0.038* 
    (0.022) (0.022) 
Inflation     0.002* 
     (0.001) 
Bank liquidity     -0.028** 
     (0.011) 
Bank crisis     0.049 
     (0.054) 
Education     -0.277** 
     (0.115) 
Observations 151 151 151 148 142 
Time effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.091 0.088    
 
First stage results 
     
Supervisory power   -0.274*** -0.301*** -0.299*** 
   (0.083) (0.088) (0.089) 
R-squared   0.232 0.248 0.258 
F-statistic (p-value)   0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table V. Bank regulations and income inequality: Sensitivity analysis 
 
The table reports coefficient estimates and robust standard errors (in parentheses) of the estimation of Equation (1) over the period 1997-
2005. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the Gini coefficient. The explanatory variables are defined in Table I. 
Regressions (1)-(5) and (8) are estimated using three-year averages, regression (6) using annual data, and regression (7) using averages 
over the period 1997-2005 (cross-sectional analysis). All regressions are estimated using 2SLS with country fixed effects and time 
effects, except for regression (6), which is a cross-sectional analysis and is estimated using simple 2SLS. The instrumental variable is 
Supervisory power, as defined in Table I. First-stage results for the instrumental variable are reported in the lower part of the table. The 
***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) 
Level of 
development 
(2) 
Non-linear 
economic 
development 
(3) 
Politics 
(4) 
Institutions 
(5) 
Bank-
based 
economies 
(6) 
Annual 
panel 
(7)  
Cross-
sectional 
analysis 
(8)  
Sensitivity 
to Gini 
standard 
errors 
Bank regulations -0.045** -0.051** -0.062** -0.066** -0.106*** -0.135*** -0.045** -0.055** 
 (0.019) (0.021) (0.025) (0.026) (0.033) (0.042) (0.021) (0.023) 
Population -0.186*** -0.199*** -0.220*** -0.216*** -0.121* -0.267*** -0.203*** -0.185*** 
 (0.051) (0.054) (0.056) (0.055) (0.063) (0.059) (0.063) (0.052) 
GDP per capita -0.082*** -0.090***   -0.093*** -0.107*** -0.076*** -0.090*** 
 (0.029) (0.029)   (0.028) (0.030) (0.027) (0.026) 
Bank regulations* 
GDP per capita 
0.080**        
(0.032)        
GDP per capita 
squared 
 0.002       
 (0.005)       
Trade openness 0.060* 0.062*   0.048 0.078** 0.030 0.016 
 (0.036) (0.037)   (0.047) (0.039) (0.046) (0.018) 
Government 
expenditure 
0.027 0.011   0.016 0.028 0.004 0.021 
(0.022) (0.030)   (0.027) (0.028) (0.049) (0.018) 
Inflation 0.009*** 0.011***   0.006** 0.013*** 0.006** 0.006** 
 (0.003) (0.004)   (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Bank liquidity -0.036** -0.034**   -0.041** -0.062*** -0.033** -0.023** 
 (0.014) (0.014)   (0.016) (0.020) (0.015) (0.011) 
Bank crisis 0.068 0.062   0.129* 0.148** 0.026 0.061 
 (0.075) (0.074)   (0.068) (0.064) (0.129) (0.075) 
Education -0.282*** -0.285***   -0.295*** -0.269*** -0.212** -0.250** 
 (0.099) (0.098)   (0.101) (0.097) (0.085) (0.096) 
Law and order    -0.042***     
    (0.010)     
Transparency    -0.050***     
    (0.010)     
Left power   -0.007      
   (0.067)      
Nonfinancial 
freedom 
  -0.048***      
  (0.015)      
Observations 241 241 220 204 123 586 89 241 
 
First stage results 
        
Supervisory power -0.345*** -0.351*** -0.416*** -0.383*** -0.218** -0.491*** -0.182** -0.374*** 
 (0.120) (0.121) (0.116) (0.110) (0.098) (0.154) (0.092) (0.117) 
R-squared 0.347 0.345 0.247 0.261 0.186 0.395 0.190 0.311 
F-statistic (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table VI. Bank regulations and the distribution of income 
 
The table reports coefficient estimates and robust standard errors (in parentheses) of the estimation of Equation (1) 
over the period 1997-2005, using three-year averages. The sample includes information from 56 countries, excluding 
advanced economies for which data on the dependent variables are generally unavailable. The dependent variable is on 
the first line below this note. The explanatory variables are defined in Table I. All regressions are estimated using 
2SLS with country fixed effects and time effects. The instrumental variable is Supervisory power, as defined in Table 
I. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 (1) 
Income share 
held by 
highest 10% 
(2) 
Income share 
held by 
highest 10% 
(3) 
Income share 
held by lowest 
10% 
(4) 
Income share 
held by 
lowest 10% 
(5) 
Poverty 
gap at 
$1.25 a day 
(6) 
Poverty gap 
at $1.25 a 
day 
Bank regulations 0.185 0.196* 0.603*** 0.531*** -0.097* -0.092* 
(0.116) (0.115) (0.177) (0.191) (0.050) (0.054) 
Population  -0.149*  -0.178**  0.139** 
 (0.082)  (0.081)  (0.068) 
GDP per capita  0.264***  0.110***  -0.148* 
  (0.084)  (0.029)  (0.076) 
Trade openness  0.099  0.128  0.096 
 (0.109)  (0.102)  (0.134) 
Government 
expenditure 
 0.126 
(0.133) 
 0.066 
(0.125) 
 0.091 
(0.086) 
Inflation  -0.001  -0.019***  0.020*** 
 
Bank liquidity 
 (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
 0.288***  0.208**  -0.303** 
  (0.083)  (0.085)  (0.132) 
Bank crisis  -0.102  -0.216**  0.109* 
  (0.067)  (0.092)  (0.064) 
Education  0.284**  0.396***  -0.450*** 
  (0.117)  (0.133)  (0.132) 
Observations 121 101 111 93 120 100 
       
First stage results       
Supervisory power -0.344*** -0.421*** -0.292** -0.302** -0.350*** -0.340** 
 (0.101) (0.122) (0.140) (0.138) (0.114) (0.161) 
R-squared 0.053 0.089 0.077 0.104 0.060 0.093 
F-statistic (p-value) 0.126 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.082 0.000 
 
 46 
 
Table VII. Different types of bank regulations and income inequality: Gini coefficient regressions 
 
The table reports coefficient estimates and robust standard errors (in parentheses) of the estimation of Equation (1) over the 
period 1997-2005 using three-year averages. The main independent variable for each regression is on the first line below this 
note and defined in Table I. The explanatory variables are also defined in Table I. All regressions are estimated by 2SLS 
with country fixed effects and time effects. The instrumental variable is Supervisory power, as defined in Table I. The ***, 
**, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 (1) 
Credit 
controls 
(2) 
Interest rate 
controls 
(3) 
Entry 
barriers 
(4) 
Banking 
supervision 
(5) 
Privatization 
 
(6) 
International 
capital flows 
(7) 
Securities 
markets 
Bank regulations -0.055** -0.092*** -0.038* -0.050** -0.069*** -0.034* 0.038** 
 (0.024) (0.032) (0.021) (0.020) (0.026) (0.019) (0.017) 
Population -0.118*** -0.111*** -0.109*** -0.114*** -0.100** -0.111*** -0.115*** 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.040) (0.035) (0.041) (0.038) (0.036) 
GDP per capita -0.070*** -0.076*** -0.075*** -0.055*** -0.074*** -0.076*** -0.065*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.020) 
Trade openness -0.003 -0.004 0.003 0.001 0.010 0.004 0.001 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.002) (0.015) (0.013) (0.010) 
Government 
expenditure 
0.021 0.023 0.021 0.015 0.018 0.019 0.019 
(0.038) (0.035) (0.035) (0.047) (0.047) (0.057) (0.056) 
Inflation 0.006** 0.004* 0.006** 0.005** 0.010*** 0.004* 0.005** 
 (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
Bank liquidity -0.155*** -0.151*** -0.156*** -0.142*** -0.116*** -0.145*** -0.143*** 
 (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.044) (0.033) (0.033) 
Bank crisis 0.067 0.063 0.066 0.070 0.058 0.064 0.077 
 (0.074) (0.071) (0.074) (0.076) (0.070) (0.070) (0.082) 
Education -0.267** -0.280** -0.283*** -0.283** -0.291*** -0.275** -0.280** 
 (0.107) (0.109) (0.106) (0.109) (0.104) (0.118) (0.111) 
Observations 241 241 241 241 241 241 241 
        
First stage results        
Supervisory power -0.263*** -0.210** -0.286*** -0.408*** -0.291** -0.307** -0.310*** 
 (0.094) (0.101) (0.081) (0.125) (0.120) (0.150) (0.106) 
R-squared 0.285 0.263 0.271 0.300 0.225 0.209 0.268 
F-statistic (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
 
